‘A new Gulag’. After 20 years without them, the FSB is getting its own jails. That’s bad news for Russians.

Meduza.io

What happened?

The Russian State Duma has passed a law restoring the right of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to operate its own pre-trial detention centers. Now, lawmakers are planning to consider two related bills, which would amend the Administrative Code, the Criminal Code, and the Criminal Procedure Code, in a first reading on July 17. All three pieces of legislation are set to take effect on January 1, 2026.

Why does the law ‘restore’ this right? Did the FSB use to have its own detention centers?

Yes — until January 1, 2006.

In July 2005, Vladimir Putin issued a decree ordering that the FSB’s detention centers be transferred to the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN), which reports to the Justice Ministry. The corresponding amendments to federal law weren’t passed until April 2006.

Why did Putin take pre-trial detention centers away from his old security agency in the first place?

Formally, he was fulfilling a commitment Russia made when it joined the Council of Europe back in 1996. At the time, Moscow pledged to transfer the penitentiary system to the Justice Ministry “as soon as possible.”

The Interior Ministry handed over all of its prisons and detention centers to the Justice Ministry back in 1998. But the FSB’s pre-trial facilities weren’t affected by that reform. For years, the authorities ignored reports from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s monitoring committee, which repeatedly urged Russia to strip the security agency of its detention centers.

Putin’s 2005 decree said that the transfer was being carried out “in order to create additional guarantees for the protection of the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of persons suspected or accused of committing crimes, and taking into account the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

What ‘additional guarantees’ was this referring to?

A person held in an FSB detention center was essentially at the full mercy of the security service. The FSB controlled both the confinement conditions and the legal process — including access to a lawyer. Without independent oversight, it was much easier for FSB agents to pressure or coerce defendants.

Is that why the FSB is getting its detention centers back now?

At the very least, it’s clear that the FSB wants its past authority restored.

In the explanatory note to the bill, the lawmakers listed as its authors openly state that since Russia “ceased its membership” in the Council of Europe in 2022, the country is “no longer bound by its obligations.”

The same document argues that, in the context of the “special military operation,” there’s a need for “additional measures to protect state secrets.” Specifically, it says suspects and defendants in cases of treason, espionage, covert cooperation with foreigners, terrorism, and extremism must be shielded from “increased interest from representatives of foreign states and organizations.”

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Will the FSB have special powers regarding prisoners that the Federal Penitentiary Service doesn’t have?

It’s hard to say for sure. On paper, the FSB will receive the same rights as the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) when it comes to guarding, transporting, and escorting suspects and defendants for investigative procedures.

On the other hand, in a comment to the official newspaper of the Russian Federal Chamber of Lawyers, attorney Alexander Polchenko noted that the rules governing detention and enforcement inside FSB facilities will be set solely by the agency’s director. He won’t be bound by the federal law “On the Detention of Suspects and Defendants” or by the Criminal Procedure Code.

We don’t even know if the internal regulations approved by the FSB director will be publicly accessible. Before the detention centers were transferred to the Justice Ministry, the FSB’s internal procedures were governed by classified instructions. Back in 2003, Novaya Gazeta reported that even some lawyers whose clients were held in Lefortovo couldn’t get access to the document outlining the rules for the facilities, which had been approved by the head of the security service.

Polchenko expects tighter restrictions on access and is concerned about the confidentiality of lawyer–client meetings in FSB-run detention centers.

Some experts are even more pessimistic about the reform. Russian intelligence researchers Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, in their analysis of the FSB detention center bills, have described the legislation as “a foundation for a new Gulag” and predicted a major expansion of repressions in the country:

Special railcars, ships, aircraft, powers to transport prisoners, and the authority to rule and punish within prison walls — all of this, under FSB control, points to preparations for repressions on a scale we haven’t yet seen.

Which detention centers will be handed over to the FSB?

We don’t have an exact list. But the bill’s explanatory note mentions pre-trial detention centers under the central authority of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service. These include:

• SIZO-1 (“Matrosskaya Tishina”) in Moscow
• SIZO-2 (“Lefortovo”) in Moscow
• SIZO-3 in St. Petersburg
• SIZO-4 in Rostov-on-Don
• SIZO-5 in Krasnodar
• SIZO-6 in Vladikavkaz
• SIZO-7 in Chelyabinsk

These are the same facilities the FSB lost control of 20 years ago.

Explainer by Denis Dmitriev