Eastern Front Prelude #0.10 Planning Operation Barbarossa

The Eastern Front Week by Week

Last time we spoke about the Blitzkrieg in Western Europe. In 1939, Europe teetered on the brink of war as tensions surged following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler, which divided Eastern Europe. With fierce ambition, Germany initiated its blitzkrieg strategy, invading Poland swiftly and decisively. In a mere thirty-five days, Polish defenses crumbled under overwhelming German might. Following Poland’s fall, Hitler’s forces turned to Denmark and Norway, capturing these territories with remarkable speed, establishing German dominance in Scandinavia. The focus then shifted westward, as Belgium and the Netherlands were quickly overrun, leading to the rapid collapse of French defenses. By June 14, 1940, the Germans stormed into Paris, signaling the end of France's defense. This sequence of events unfolded with shocking speed, causing global astonishment. The blitzkrieg campaign established Germany as a formidable force, setting the stage for a conflict that would engulf the world and dramatically alter its landscape.

This episode is Prelude #10 Planning Operation Barbarossa

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Hello again, today we are edging closer to the beginning of the Eastern Front. Following the disastrous Winter War with Finland, Stalin aimed to reorganize the Red Army. Fresh from the purges, he also opted for a reshuffling of leadership. While tensions ran high, very few, if any, leaders of the Red Army faced purges due to the outcomes of the Winter War. In February 1940, General of the Army Zhukov was summoned to Moscow to assume the role of Chief of the General Staff. Now Zhukov will be a towering figure in this series, so why not go through a short bio on him?

Zhukov was born into a struggling peasant family of Russian descent in Strelkovka, located in the Maloyaroslavsky District of the Kaluga Governorate in western Russia, about 62 miles east of Moscow. His father, Konstantin, who was orphaned at the age of two and later adopted by Anuska Zhukova, worked as a cobbler. His mother, Ustin'ya, was a peasant laborer. Zhukov was believed to have taken after his mother, claiming he inherited her physical strength; Ustin'ya was reportedly capable of handling tough tasks, such as transporting 200-pound sacks of grain over long distances. At a time when most individuals from the lower and working classes in Russia received only two years of education, Zhukov completed a three-year primary schooling at his local school. He later became an apprentice to his uncle Mikhail in Moscow, learning the furrier trade. While working with his uncle, Zhukov enhanced his education by reading various subjects, including the Russian and German languages, science, geography, and mathematics, alongside his cousin Alexander. He also enrolled in night school, completing courses as time allowed while working in his uncle's shop. By 1914, he finished his apprenticeship and started his own fur business, employing three young workers.

In 1915, Zhukov was drafted into the Imperial Russian Army, serving in the 10th Dragoon Novgorod Regiment, where he was wounded during combat against the Germans at Kharkov. Throughout World War I, he was awarded the Cross of St. George twice for his bravery and was promoted to non-commissioned officer ranks due to his valor in battle. After the October Revolution of 1917, he joined the Bolsheviks, where his background of poverty served as an advantage in party circles. Following a severe bout of typhus, he participated in the Russian Civil War, serving in the Second Cavalry Brigade under Commander Semyon Timoshenko, which was later incorporated into the 1st Cavalry Army led by Semyon Budyonny. In 1920, he completed a cavalry officer training course and received his commission as an officer. In recognition of his role in suppressing the Tambov Rebellion in 1921, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Zhukov rapidly progressed through the ranks, becoming the commander of a cavalry troop and squadron, then the deputy commander of a cavalry regiment. By late May 1923, he was appointed as the commander of the 39th Cavalry Regiment. The following year, he entered the Higher School of Cavalry and graduated in 1924, after which he returned to command the same regiment. According to Friedrich von Mellenthin, "It is not generally realized that Zhukov received much of his early training in Germany. Together with other Russian officers, and by arrangement with the Reichswehr, he attended courses at German military schools in the 1920s. He spent some time attached to a cavalry regiment under Colonel Dingler, who vividly recalled Zhukov's boisterous behavior and the large amounts of liquor he and his comrades consumed after dinner. Nevertheless, it is evident that Zhukov made good use of his time in military training." Zhukov attended the Frunze Military Academy from 1929 until his graduation in 1930. In May 1930, he became commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division. By February 1931, he was appointed as the Assistant Inspector of Cavalry for the Red Army.

In May 1933, Zhukov became the commander of the 4th Cavalry Division. During the Great Purge, when thousands of officers were arrested and executed; Zhukov and those associated with the First Cavalry Army were spared, as they were involved in conflicts with the Japanese near Manchuria. By 1937, he commanded the 3rd Cavalry Corps and later the 6th Cavalry Corps. In 1938, he was appointed as the deputy cavalry commander of the Belorussian Military District. Later in 1938, Zhukov was assigned to lead the First Soviet Mongolian People's Army, engaging in combat against Japan’s Kwantung Army along the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Japanese-held state of Manchukuo. The Soviet-Japanese border clashes lasted from 1938 to 1939. What started as a border skirmish quickly escalated into a full-scale war, with the Japanese advancing with around 80,000 troops, 180 tanks, and 450 aircraft. This escalation led to the crucial battle of Khalkhin Gol. Zhukov called for significant reinforcements, and on August 20, 1939, his Soviet offensive commenced.

Following a substantial artillery barrage, nearly 500 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks advanced, backed by over 500 fighters and bombers, marking the Soviet Air Force's first fighter-bomber operation. Initially, the offensive seemed like a standard frontal assault. However, Zhukov executed a pincer movement, a classic cavalry strategy holding back two tank brigades before ordering them to advance around both flanks, supported by motorized artillery, infantry, and other tanks. This bold maneuver successfully encircled the Japanese 6th Army and captured their vulnerable supply lines. By August 31, the Japanese forces were expelled from the contested border, resulting in a clear Soviet victory. This campaign held importance beyond its immediate tactical and local consequences. Zhukov tested and refined techniques that would later be employed against the Germans on the Eastern Front during WW2. His innovative tactics included using underwater bridges and enhancing the cohesion and effectiveness of inexperienced units by integrating a handful of seasoned veterans to improve morale and overall training.

The assessment of the issues faced by the BT tanks led to replacements of their flammable gasoline engines with diesel engines. This battle provided critical insights that contributed to the successful development of the T-34 medium tank utilized in WW2. Following this campaign, veterans were systematically reassigned to newer units to disseminate their combat experience. For his success, Zhukov was honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union. However, the campaign, and particularly Zhukov's groundbreaking tank strategies, remained relatively unknown outside the Soviet Union. Zhukov viewed Khalkhin Gol as crucial preparation for future operations in WW2. By May 1940, he attained the rank of army general, becoming one of only eight senior Red Army officers.

Upon taking command, a comprehensive reorganization of the country's defense forces was initiated. There is some debate regarding how much of this restructuring was Zhukov's idea, but he demonstrated the same level of competence in this new position as he had in the field. The army in the western region of the country was divided into five specialized military districts, which were designed to create defensive fronts to withstand any invasion while the primary forces were mobilized. These districts were based in Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, Kyiv, and Odesa, respectively becoming known as the Northern, North-Western, Western, South-Western, and Southern Fronts. Essentially, these were provisional staff organizations that would be supplemented with mobilized units as determined by the Stavka.

At the time, it was widely recognized that the upper echelons of the Army's command structure had been profoundly impacted by the purges. However, what remained unclear was the fate of the mid-level officers responsible for leading the divisions and regiments of the Red Army in 1941. These individuals were generally younger than their counterparts in the Wehrmacht, and in many instances, division commanders lacked any formal military training. To complicate matters, many of these officers had very little time to prepare their troops. Developing skilled tactical leaders requires time, and experience must be acquired through the operation of units. Effective maneuvers need to be planned and executed on training grounds to educate officers on the principles of division-level combat. Regrettably for the Red Army, this crucial experience would have to be gained in the theater of war. Post-war literature excoriates Red Army leaders for “Human Wave” tactics. This is only partially a legitimate criticism. Such wasteful tactics certainly happened, but they were primarily due to poor state of command and control. Division, Corps and even some Army commanders had no experience in maneuvering large units in battle. Even when they did, the desperate strategic situation was often such that there was no choice but to conduct large scale frontal assaults on prepared German positions. As the war progressed, officers of all ranks gained experience in tactical movement. Additionally, the strategic situation improved slowly. This allowed for assaults to be well supported with Artillery, Armor and Air. By 1945 “Human Waves” were a relic of the past. Combat was still bloody, but it was not desperate assaults of 1941.

The country's defense against a threat from the west was structured into strategic layers. There were two layers of the regular army and a forward defense element at the border. This border defense comprised NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in "fortified regions." These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and manning the fortifications along the USSR's border. By June 1941, there were fifty-seven fortified regions, with forty-two located in the west, totaling one hundred ninety thousand personnel. The NKVD Border Guards had around one hundred sixty-five thousand members across their various units and detachments. The goal was for these forces to resist any invasion while the rest of the Army mobilized and positioned for counterattacks. If that failed, they would create a substantial obstacle to slow the enemy down. However, their location near the border required them to be ready before any invasion attempt to effectively delay or repel the enemy. Unfortunately, this objective was not achievable on the day of the attack, as Stalin's late order to prepare the troops did not allow sufficient time for them to take their positions. Lastly, the NKVD Railroad Security forces, consisting of approximately sixty-two thousand men, were deployed around the country’s railroad depots, bridges, and other key logistics areas.

The country's defense against a western threat was structured into strategic levels. It consisted of two strategic echelons of the regular army and a forward border defense unit. This border defense was formed by the NKVD border guard detachments and regular soldiers stationed in the "fortified regions." The NKVD Border Guard detachments were independent units who were armed and equipped as light infantry but fell under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or NKVD. This was in opposition to the Red Army’s Fortified Regions, which were division sized elements intended to be able to build and man bunkers along the border. Both types of units were emplaced along the border to a depth of approximately 20km.

These troops were responsible for constructing, enhancing, and staffing the fortifications along the USSR's border. On June 22, 1941, the Fortified Regions only had 47% of their men and 27% of their officers. Around 50% of the authorized fortifications had been built. This, when combined with the late authorization to go over to full alert from Moscow, spelled disaster for the defense of the border.

The subsequent line of defense is often called the first strategic echelon, comprising the initial standalone units of the Red Army. This force consisted of fifteen field armies divided into the five Fronts mentioned earlier, totaling one hundred sixty-six divisions. On the Northern Front, the 7th, 14th, and 23rd Armies comprised twenty-two divisions, supported by reserves including three independent rifle divisions and a motorized corps. They were positioned along the Soviet-Finnish border, extending from Leningrad to the Barents Sea. The Northwestern Front, covering the areas of the former Baltic Republics, had three field armies available. The 27th Army was in reserve around the Ostrov area alongside the 5th Airborne Corps, while the 8th and 11th Armies were stationed along the front that faced German East Prussia down to Vilnius. Together, these forces totaled twenty-nine divisions. The Western Front consisted of four armies, three of which were positioned along the border with German-occupied Poland. The 3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies were deployed near the border, with the 13th Army held in reserve further behind the lines near Minsk. Overall, this front, including reserves, had forty-three divisions.The Southwestern Front was the largest of the Red Army’s formations. The 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies were deployed along the front, supported by substantial reserves situated behind them. With four rifle divisions, two motorized divisions, and an airborne corps, the Southwestern Front possessed considerable strength that could create secondary lines to safeguard the retreat of its forward forces, a luxury that none of its counterparts would enjoy during the initial days of the invasion.

The Southern front was the smallest, comprising just one field army. Its fourteen divisions were stationed along the Romanian border near the port of Odesa. In contrast, the 9th Army was considerably larger than its northern counterparts, partly because of the extensive area it needed to cover. This region was also not perceived as a probable zone of operations. While the source material is vague on this point, it’s possible that Stalin did not anticipate the Romanians would actively engage against the Soviet Union. It was clear that Germany had become the dominant political force in internal Romanian politics by this point. Stalin was under no illusions of this. It had been one of the flaring points in the rising tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. Bessarbia had been occupied in June 1940. The German campaigns in the Balkans and Greece were seen as counterweights to Soviet influence in the region.

Behind these field armies, the Stavka Reserve was positioned in the second strategic echelon, consisting of fifty-seven divisions spread across six field armies. Three of these armies, the 19th, 21st, and 22nd, were stationed west of Moscow, each positioned behind one of the main fronts. The 20th Army was located near the capital, while the 16th and 24th Armies were stationed in Siberia, based in Chita. They were set to advance westward eventually, but for now, they served to maintain the Red Army’s presence along the lengthy stretch of the Soviet Union, linking the Far Eastern Front to the capital. In this deployment framework, plans were crafted for the country's defense. The armies in the first strategic echelon were expected to bear the primary impact of the enemy invasion. Aiming to strengthen the border guards and occupy the defensive positions along the border, they would require time to mobilize. Within this echelon, the initial operational reserve was designated to be the main component of the Red Army's counterattack capability. In this context, an Operational Reserve can be distinguished from a Strategic Reserve. The first type are units that may be fed into battle, usually piecemeal to short up weakened defenses or a to help carry forward a struggling attack. Units in a Strategic Reserve are typically used as a bloc in order to build a counter-offensive capability on a wide scale. Any breaches in the border defense would be managed by these forces, while the Red Army's strategy focused on creating substantial counterattacks to strike back at the invaders utilizing the Stavka Reserve.

After France's defeat, it became clear that a war with Germany and its allies was likely unavoidable. Following some discussions, the consensus emerged that the most probable approach would involve fighting on two fronts: Germany and its European partners would launch attacks in the West, while Japan would aggressively target the armies in the Far East. Although plans were frequently adjusted, the overarching strategy was to ensure that the border forces could effectively hold off the invaders while the majority of the Red Army was mobilized and positioned for a major counter-offensive in the West. This operation was primarily envisioned to come from the Southwestern front, advancing northwest towards Lublin, continuing to Lodz, and ultimately reaching Danzig. Such a daring maneuver aimed to isolate the enemy along the border. Throughout the latter half of 1940, discussions persisted regarding the focal point of the German offensive. In October, Stalin asserted his belief that the Germans would primarily target Ukraine and its rich natural resources. Ironically, during this same period Hitler was struggling with his General Staff about where the main effort should be focused. No explicit agreement was reached beyond the destruction of the Red Army being the first priority. This indecision would come to haunt the Wehrmacht’s war effort throughout 1941. Hitler eventually decided that Ukraine would be the first priority, but only after months of indecisive combat had drained the resources of the Wehrmacht.

Despite the challenges, the Soviet Union began implementing several defensive measures. A significant portion of their efforts focused on expanding industrial capabilities to produce equipment and ammunition. They placed substantial orders for large quantities of the latest tank models, the T-34 and the KV-1. While it would take time for these tanks to reach frontline units in sufficient quantities, it was crucial to establish production capacity as soon as possible. This urgency stemmed partly from the Soviet Union's ongoing shortage of machinery necessary for mass weapon and ammunition production. While Stalin sought to gain favor with Hitler by increasing exports to Germany, Hitler was reducing deliveries to the Soviet Union. To address this gap, Stalin placed extensive orders for machinery at German factories, highlighting the long way the Soviet Union had to go to establish a robust industrial base for a protracted conflict. By the summer of 1941, it was well understood among the top leadership that the production capacity was inadequate. There was a significant shortfall of anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, and even modern field artillery, and ammunition for these weapons was also being produced in insufficient quantities.

In addition to the fundamental reorganization of the frontier into designated areas of responsibility, there was the requirement for a thorough overhaul of the Red Army's order of battle. The independent tank units had been suspended sometime after the invasion of Poland, and following the observation of the German campaigns in the West, the Stavka recognized the error of this decision. They began to reinstate these units, founding tank divisions and mechanized corps that were included in the Red Army’s organizational structure. However, these formations were fundamentally different from the German concept of Panzer groups, which were designed for strategic objectives like breakthroughs and subsequent encirclements. The classic example of this was the 1940 campaign in France and the low countries. Infantry units held down the bulk of the enemy army, and the panzers selected a strategic weak point, orchestrated a breakthrough and then conducted a sweeping envelopment, cutting off the enemy’s lines of retreat.

In contrast, Soviet tank units were allocated to individual field armies for localized breakthrough operations and counterattacks. While the Red Army's doctrine would later evolve, it remained relatively rudimentary in 1941. These reformed units were essentially being built from the ground up, a process that required considerable time, resources, and personnel. Many of the tank divisions were significantly understrength on June 22, 1941. Although exact figures for each unit are difficult to ascertain, three divisions serve as a broadly representative example of the Red Army as a whole. The tank divisions were critically lacking in the modern equipment they were supposed to possess. For instance, the 1st Tank Division had less than ten percent of its authorized 62 KV-1 heavy tanks, while the medium tank battalions fared no better, with only 38 percent of their authorized strength of 206 T-34 tanks. The failure to adequately equip these divisions with modern tanks was further exacerbated by the presence of obsolete tanks, creating a misleading impression of strength that would later trouble commanders in the early months of the campaign. Overall, there were 40 tank divisions in the Western Theatre. To achieve full authorized strength, 8240 T-34s and 2480 KV-1s were needed. However, by June, 967 T-34s and 508 KV-1s had been delivered. Across the theatre, the Red Army managed to acquire just 11 percent of the required medium tanks and twenty percent of the necessary heavy tanks.

The tank arm was not the only aspect of the Red Army that faced significant issues in the final days of peace. In the early 1940s, the standard structure of rifle divisions was modified to a more streamlined format. This change was partly because tanks were removed from their role of infantry support, where they had previously been included in the infantry division. This is similar to the French model, where infantry divisions had organic medium and heavy tank elements that would support the infantry division’s breakthrough. This was another theory of armor employment that was borne out of the experience of the first world war. It proved to be the inferior model in many respects to the German theory of massed armored formations conducting breakthroughs on their own accord. The Red Army’s leadership was merely following the trends of theory development as they saw it. They were not alone. The US Army was also continuing development of their concept of armor employment in response to German successes in Western Europe.

However, this reduction in division size on paper did not reflect the actual strength of the units in the field. Some rifle divisions deployed in the western theater were so undermanned that it bordered on absurdity. The peacetime personnel levels of the Red Army were set by Stavka, following decisions made by the NKO regarding readiness measures. NKO is the acronym for the Soviet Union’s equivalent to the Modern US Department of Defense. Stavka was the military high command, but they ultimately reported to the NKO head, called the People’s Commissar for Defense of the Soviet Union. In June 1941 this position was held by Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko. After the invasion began, he was also named the Chairman of Stavka, but eventually gave both of these positions to Stalin. These strengths were periodically reviewed, fluctuating up or down, but they never reached the full mobilization strength of approximately 14,500 soldiers. By June 1941, the authorized strength had risen to as high as 85%. While this represented progress, not all divisions achieved this level. Some divisions were recorded as having less than 42% of their authorized personnel. This figure was further diminished by absences due to leave, illness, or desertion.

The Red Air Force faced significant challenges in its efforts to rebuild and redeploy in the west based on the new strategic framework. Drawing lessons from the Winter War and the Spanish Civil War, the Red Air Force revised its mission objectives. Prior to these conflicts, the emphasis had been on long-range bombing aimed at destroying enemy airfields and industrial facilities. However, the updated strategies prioritized tactical air superiority and close air support over such missions. This shift was a logical decision, one that resonated with air forces globally. Nonetheless, difficulties emerged with the strategies implemented to achieve these new objectives. The air force was organized into regiments, with aircraft assigned to Front and Army commanders, allowing them to deploy the planes as they preferred. In practice, this led to the widespread dispersion of the Red Air Force to satisfy local commanders' needs. Consequently, smaller frontier airfields became overcrowded with aircraft due to command-and-control complications. This overcrowding resulted in many planes being stationed too close to the border, lacking the space and time necessary to respond effectively to German air formations. As a result, thousands of aircraft were destroyed on the ground in the early days of the invasion, caught off guard by surprise attacks. The pride of the Soviet military was on the brink of being systematically eliminated. In addition to these placement issues, the Red Air Force also struggled with modernization, as insufficient industrial capacity had been allocated for the production and delivery of the advanced aircraft required.

The mobilization plans were not fully realized when the Germans launched their invasion, and actual implementation was even less developed. The fundamental flaw in the Red Army’s mobilization strategy was its reliance on the assumption that they would receive advance warning before any attack. In retrospect, this assumption seems absurd and outdated. The slow-moving armies of World War I had adhered to lengthy mobilization timelines that often took weeks or even months. However, given the context of that time, it was not unreasonable to believe that the Red Army would have sufficient time for mobilization. The unmistakable signs of the German army's mobilization and deployment in 1939 were evident to all. The Poles were unprepared, largely due to internal indecision and external pressures from the UK and France that a mobilization of the Polish Army would give the Germans reason to invade. This proved to be a senseless hesitancy on their part that cost the Poles their country. Appeasing Hitler, even in the short term did not stay his hand. Stalin would have to learn this lesson for himself, even after watching it happen many times before.

By 1940, the only uncertainty was about the main thrust of the Wehrmacht, not whether they had prepared and mobilized. Much of this uncertainty stemmed from the density of their deployments, allowing forces in one location to strike in various directions. The Red Army was justified in expecting a warning to facilitate mobilization; in fact, they received ample warnings. What was missing was the authorization to mobilize, which came from Stalin himself. It was unpredictable that Stalin would hesitate and issue orders against mobilizing when every indicator suggested otherwise. Front-line intelligence signaled to Stavka, and covert sources within the Soviet Union indicated an impending attack. Both the US and UK provided warnings concerning Germany's intentions. In early 1941, the US Government informed the Soviet Ambassador that Germany was planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring. The British also communicated that they were aware of Germany's invasion plans. Stalin chose to ignore these alerts. Even in April, despite firm warnings from the British government that Hitler was preparing to invade, Stalin remained dismissive. The British Government was not fazed by Stalin’s refusal to see the truth and continued to regularly warn his government of the attack. As late as June 18th, they had told the Soviet Ambassador that the German attack was “inevitable” and would come not later than the middle of June. Only three more days would pass before they were proved right.

Stalin routinely characterized these alerts as “English provocations” and “clumsy fabrications.” This decision-making failure, rather than a lack of warnings, spelled doom for the Red Army. While discussions of tactical and strategic surprise are common in analyses of the invasion's early days, they are often overstated. Many individual units were not in position because they were not permitted to deploy. They were not fully staffed because, in many instances, mobilization had not been authorized. Soldiers cannot simply appear when requested by Colonels or Generals; they must be summoned from their civilian lives, organized, and assigned to their units. These responsibilities fall to the highest levels of any bureaucracy. In the Soviet Union, as in many other countries, such decisions were made by top authorities. Stalin chose to restrain the army, and they ultimately paid the consequences of that choice.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Stalin watched in horror as the Germans conquered most of western Europe in a lighting fast sweep. All Stalin could do was speed up the training and military production of the USSR, hoping he could bide enough time to meet the enormous threat to his west. Despite numerous warnings, he was not prepared for the storm that was coming.