Artwork

Content provided by Audioboom and Emerson Green. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Audioboom and Emerson Green or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://ppacc.player.fm/legal.
Player FM - Podcast App
Go offline with the Player FM app!

80 - You Are A Soul w/ Ralph Stefan Weir

3:36:59
 
Share
 

Manage episode 465887318 series 2612571
Content provided by Audioboom and Emerson Green. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Audioboom and Emerson Green or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://ppacc.player.fm/legal.
Ralph Stefan Weir joins me to discuss his book, The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. We talk about the myth of the interaction problem, the connection between theism and the soul, the implausibility of property dualism, substance dualism in Eastern thought, the causal closure argument and energy conservation, a posteriori necessities, modal rationalism, panpsychism and idealism, personal identity, transhumanism, mind-uploading, split brain cases, whether souls are eternal, and much else.
Dustin Crummett's interview with Dr. Weir

. . .
For reference, here are the two arguments from the book we spent the most time on:
DISEMBODIMENT ARGUMENT

(i) The phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical.
(ii) If the phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical, then they do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.
(iii) Therefore, the phenomenal facts do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.

PARITY ARGUMENT

(i) If you accept the conceivability argument, you must accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument.
(ii) If you accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.
(iii) Therefore, if you accept the conceivability argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

. . .
Linktree

  continue reading

97 episodes

Artwork

80 - You Are A Soul w/ Ralph Stefan Weir

Walden Pod

255 subscribers

published

iconShare
 
Manage episode 465887318 series 2612571
Content provided by Audioboom and Emerson Green. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Audioboom and Emerson Green or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://ppacc.player.fm/legal.
Ralph Stefan Weir joins me to discuss his book, The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. We talk about the myth of the interaction problem, the connection between theism and the soul, the implausibility of property dualism, substance dualism in Eastern thought, the causal closure argument and energy conservation, a posteriori necessities, modal rationalism, panpsychism and idealism, personal identity, transhumanism, mind-uploading, split brain cases, whether souls are eternal, and much else.
Dustin Crummett's interview with Dr. Weir

. . .
For reference, here are the two arguments from the book we spent the most time on:
DISEMBODIMENT ARGUMENT

(i) The phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical.
(ii) If the phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical, then they do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.
(iii) Therefore, the phenomenal facts do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.

PARITY ARGUMENT

(i) If you accept the conceivability argument, you must accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument.
(ii) If you accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.
(iii) Therefore, if you accept the conceivability argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

. . .
Linktree

  continue reading

97 episodes

All episodes

×
 
Loading …

Welcome to Player FM!

Player FM is scanning the web for high-quality podcasts for you to enjoy right now. It's the best podcast app and works on Android, iPhone, and the web. Signup to sync subscriptions across devices.

 

Quick Reference Guide

Listen to this show while you explore
Play