What’s next, and why? How the Ukraine war’s uncertainty complicates NATO planning and shapes future Russian aggression

Meduza.io

Earlier this week, Bloomberg published a comprehensive report, complete with swirling infographics and color-coded maps marked with thick attack arrows, modeling a theoretical Russian war with NATO. The journalists estimate that such a conflict would cost the world $1.5 trillion. On the same day Bloomberg published its report, The New Yorker released a story by Joshua Yaffa describing how European panic about being abandoned by the Trump administration in the event of a Russian invasion has led NATO members to commit to shouldering a greater share of the bloc’s defense burden. A few days later, at a summit in the Netherlands, NATO leaders agreed to boost defense spending from the current goal of two percent of their gross domestic product to five percent (albeit with some creative accounting).

To understand how the Kremlin might respond to growing fears in Europe that Russia will challenge NATO’s collective security, Meduza’s Vladislav Gorin spoke to Maksim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. In an interview with the podcast “Chto Sluchilos,” Samorukov described the likely conditions of a Russian assault on NATO members and weighed the prospect of a full-scale war. Meduza in English summarizes these remarks.

A NATO challenge depends on a Ukraine settlement

The recent spike in speculation about a Russian attack on NATO looks like an attempt to “extrapolate what has been happening in Ukraine in recent years to other European countries,” Samorukov told Meduza. Perhaps the biggest issue with today’s analysis, he said, is that Moscow is very unlikely to test NATO’s solidarity on the battlefield before completely resolving “the Ukrainian question” as the Kremlin understands it. Samorukov suggested that Russia might finally agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine after “some partial success,” especially in light of the glacial pace of the West’s rearmament.

But if there is a ceasefire, the next war will be with Ukraine all over again, not with Europe. “As long as Ukraine exists in its current form, it’s hard to imagine that Russia would switch away and suddenly start attacking Latvia or somewhere else,” said Samorukov.

However, if Russia settles Ukraine to the Kremlin’s satisfaction, “the intoxication of victory” could lead Moscow to press further, while Europe remains weak and divided, and while Russia’s army is large and its economy is dependent on a thriving military-industrial complex.

The Kremlin has voiced multiple concerns about Europe’s post-Cold War security arrangements. Much of the speculation in the West about potential Russian encroachment focuses on small-scale pressure designed to test NATO’s willingness to defend border cities in the Baltic states. Samorukov pointed out that the invasion of Ukraine has created new problems in Europe for Russia that will “come to the forefront” after a settlement with Kyiv. He noted that rising defense budgets across NATO are also sure to influence Moscow’s future behavior: “Europe's building up its military, and they're doing it to counter Russia. This will obviously provoke retaliatory irritation in Russia and create pressure either to rearm in kind or halt Europe’s rearmament before it’s done.”

The Kaliningrad conundrum

One of Russia’s most pressing concerns, said Samorukov, is in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania:

How are you supposed to sail there? What about logistics when you’ve got Estonia trying to inspect tankers and so on? And there’s the problem of Russian exports through the Baltic Sea, for example, when Denmark says it can examine whether Russian tankers, the shadow fleet, comply with Danish environmental standards.

From Moscow’s perspective, obstructed access to Kaliningrad — undisputed Russian territory — is an outrage that threatens the nation’s basic security. Samorukov warned that the Kremlin might even conclude that Kaliningrad’s vulnerable position amounts to a blockade, which is grounds for declaring war.

“If Lithuania doesn’t restore normal access to Kaliningrad, even through Belarus, then Russia is basically saying it won’t answer for the consequences,” Samorukov explained. In this scenario, if Russia tested NATO’s willingness to defend Lithuania, Moscow could argue that it was seeking a corridor to blockaded Russian soil, not undertaking another occupation.

Rising concern about Moscow turning its military against the Baltic states is closely tied to the current perception that Russia is winning in Ukraine. However, the war has entered its “unpredictable phase,” said Samorukov, and the pace of the invasion’s advance, along with the possibility of “qualitative leaps” in combat, leaves the conflict’s outcome undetermined.

Another vital factor is Russia’s political leadership, which fundamentally depends on the whims and heartbeat of one man, Samorukov explained: “Nobody lives forever, and something could happen for any number of reasons that can’t be predicted. A change at the top in Russia could transform everything.”

Interview by Vladislav Gorin

Excerpted and adapted for Meduza in English by Kevin Rothrock

Photo on cover: Kremlin Press Service